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This paper examines the demand for hockey game trips among metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan residents of Alberta, Canada. Using data on both revealed and stated 
preference game-trip behavior from a telephone survey conducted throughout Alberta, 
we estimate the effect of ticket prices, team quality, arena amenities, and capacity 
on the latent demand for National Hockey League hockey games. We find that lower 
ticket prices, higher team quality, and additional capacity encourage attendance. In 
the status quo scenario, consumer surplus per game is $50 for those who had attended 
hockey games and about 50% less for those who had not attended games. Exploiting 
the stated preference data, we develop a number of other consumer surplus estimates. 
We also include travel costs in the estimation of the demand function and estimate 
the full value of the game trip considering both ticket prices and travel costs. Sold- 
out arenas in Calgary and Edmonton generate annual consumption benefits of $40 
and $35 million when only ticket prices are used to calculate consumer surplus (i.e., 
excluding travel costs). Considering the full-price consumer surplus for the Calgary 
Flames of $103 per game trip, the annual consumption benefits may be as high as 
$82 million. (JEL R22, L83, D61) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Baltimore Orioles moved from 
their 1950s-vintage home in Memorial Stadium 
to Oriole Park at Camden Yards in 1992, a new 
era in stadium and arena construction dawned in 
North American professional sports. The greatly 
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enhanced premium seating, luxury suites, con- 
cessions, sight lines, and other amenities made 
possible by advances in architectural design and 
construction technology led to large increases 
in revenues for the Orioles. Teams in Major 
League Baseball (MLB), the National Football 
League (NFL), the National Basketball Associ- 
ation (NBA), and the National Hockey League 
(NHL) joined the rush to replace their now eco- 
nomically obsolete arenas and stadiums with 
their own versions of Camden Yards. Of the 
30 NHL teams, 25 have moved into new are- 
nas since 1993. Several other facilities are under 
consideration. 
Two teams that have not moved into new 
arenas are the Edmonton Oilers and the Calgary 
Flames, Alberta’s two teams in the NHL. The 
Oilers continue to play in Rexall Place, located 
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just outside downtown Edmonton, which opened 
in 1974. The Flames play in the Scotiabank 
Saddledome, dating from 1983. Management of 
both teams complain of a lack of space for 
luxury suites and other premium seating, as well 
as cramped facilities for concessions, placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage with other 
teams in the league (Kom 2008; Mah 2007). 
As a result, a need for new facilities  has 
been expressed in both cities, where discussion 
has focused on where the new arenas would be 
sited and to what extent they would be pub- 
licly financed (Mason 2010). This paper takes 
the opportunity presented by the possibility of 
new NHL arenas in Alberta to examine the 
demand for hockey game trips among resi- 
dents of Edmonton, Calgary, and the rest of the 
province of Alberta. Using data on both revealed 
and stated preferences from a  telephone  sur- 
vey conducted throughout Alberta, we estimate 
the effect of ticket prices, team quality, arena 
amenities, and capacity on the latent demand 
for NHL hockey. Unlike most attendance stud- 
ies, we measure private consumption benefits of 
new arenas, in the form of consumer surplus, 
to current and future game attendees. Further- 
more, unlike the one previous study that econo- 
metrically estimated consumer surplus for game 
attendance (Irani 1997), this paper includes data 
on travel costs in the estimation of the demand 
function, allowing an estimate of the full con- 
sumer surplus. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Economists have conducted many empirical 
analyses of the demand for attendance at sport- 
ing contests. Borland and Macdonald (2003) 
discuss the conceptual issues and provide a the- 
oretical discussion of the demand for sporting 
events. Two studies in particular are relevant to 
this paper because they address the impact of 
new stadiums and arenas on season attendance. 
Zygmont and Leadley (2005) use a panel data 
set of season attendance spanning 1970 – 2000 in 
MLB to estimate the “honeymoon effects” of a 
new stadium on attendance and ticket prices, and 
find substantial positive effects on both that per- 
sist, with only modest declines, for 8 – 10 years. 
They conclude that a baseball-only stadium that 
replaces an older multipurpose stadium will gen- 
erate an additional $228 million in ticket rev- 
enue over 15 years. 
Leadley and Zygmont (2006) test for honey- 
moon effects in the NHL from 1970 to 2003 
using Tobit analysis as the capacity constraint 
is usually binding in the NHL, unlike in MLB. 
For instance, during the 2009 – 2010 season, 11 
NHL teams achieved season attendance greater 
than or equal to 100% of seating capacity with 
an additional 6 teams operating at better than 
97% capacity. In MLB in 2010, five total teams 
exceeded 90%, with only three of those playing 
to full capacity for the entire season. The hon- 
eymoon effect in the NHL from 1994 to 2003, a 
period in which 21 new arenas opened, increased 
an NHL team’s attendance by 15% – 20% and 
the honeymoon lasted eight years. 
There have been many other attendance stud- 
ies, most of them focusing on game-by-game 
attendance rather than season attendance. Base- 
ball and soccer attendance  have  been  stud- 
ied more often than attendance in other sports 
(Borland and Macdonald 2003). Among the 
many baseball articles are Bruggink and Eaton 
(1996),  Kahane  and  Shmanske  (1997), 
Butler (2002), Coates and Harrison (2005), and 
Donihue, Findlay, and Newberry (2007). Soc- 
cer attendance in European leagues has been 
the subject of studies by Garcia and Rodriguez 
(2002) and Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002), 
among others. Welki and Zlatopper (1994, 1999) 
estimated game-day attendance in the NFL, 
while Price and Sen (2003) did so for Division 
I-A (now called the Football Bowl Subdivision) 
college football. Attendance at NBA games has 
been estimated by Burdekin and Idson (1991), 
and attendance at NHL games by Paul (2003). 
Despite the differences in locations, time 
periods, and sports, the attendance studies have 
found broadly similar results. Most studies have 
found that ticket prices have a negative impact 
on attendance, though not always, and that 
except for Bruggink and Eaton (1996), demand 
tends to be inelastic with respect to price. The 
inelasticity of demand is surprising considering 
that the local monopolies usually enjoyed by 
professional sports teams should result in prices 
where demand is price-elastic. Many studies 
have also found that income affects demand, 
with sports more often than not being a normal 
good. However, in some cases, as in baseball 
(Bruggink and Eaton 1996), a sport appears to be 
an inferior good, even as the same sport appears 
to be a normal good in other studies. Quality 
of competition consistently proves significant: 
the better the home team and its opponent, the 
higher the attendance. 
Irani (1997) estimates a  demand  function 
for MLB using actual 1985 season attendance, 
 
 
as opposed to the usual game-by-game atten- 
dance, and ticket price data. Using his esti- 
mates to calculate the choke price for MLB 
tickets and integrating the estimated attendance 
function over the range of ticket prices, he 
calculates average annual consumer surplus of 
about $35 million (2007 dollars) per team (Irani 
1997). Alexander, Kern, and Neill (2000) cal- 
culate consumer surplus by assuming a con- 
stant elasticity demand function, and combine 
evidence of team revenues with assumptions 
about different demand elasticities. Not surpris- 
ingly, the amount of consumer surplus depends 
strongly on the value of the assumed elastic- 
ity. Alexander, Kern, and Neill did not estimate 
any demand functions or price elasticities with 
attendance data. 
Methods developed by environmental econ- 
omists to measure the value of public and private 
benefits of consumption provide the means to 
improve upon the estimates of sports consumer 
surplus developed by Irani and Alexander, Kern, 
and Neill. In this paper, we use the travel cost 
method, which is a revealed preference method 
most often used to estimate recreation benefits 
(Phaneuf and Smith 2005), but it has also been 
used to estimate the benefits of other goods such 
as health care (Clarke 2002). The travel and time 
costs incurred to get to an activity site can con- 
stitute a major cost of participating in the recre- 
ation activity. As individuals reside at varying 
distances from stadiums, the variation in dis- 
tance and the number of trips taken can be used 
to estimate a demand function and derive the 
benefits of attendance and stadium characteris- 
tics. Revealed preference approaches are limited 
to the variation in historical experience. Fore- 
casts beyond are often inaccurate or impossible. 
Stated preference methods provide additional 
tools to estimate the benefits of sporting events 
and  amenities.  Stated  preference  approaches 
include the contingent valuation method (CVM) 
and  the  contingent  behavior  method  (CBM). 
The CVM uses willingness to pay responses to 
hypothetical situations to estimate benefits. Over 
the past decade or so, economists have extended 
the use of CVM to sports in order to estimate the 
use and nonuse values of sports public goods. 
In  the  seminal  CVM  sports  article,  Johnson 
and  Whitehead  (2000)  survey  respondents  in 
Lexington, Kentucky, who are asked whether 
and how much they would be willing to pay 
for a new basketball arena for the University of 
Kentucky and for a baseball stadium to attract 
a  minor  league  team.  For  both  projects,  the 
nonmarket  benefits  fall  short  of  the  costs  of 
constructing the new buildings. 
Since Johnson and Whitehead (2000) there 
have been a number of CVM studies of sports 
public goods. Civic unity, community pride, 
improved racial relations, and topics of conver- 
sation are some of the public goods addressed 
by sports CVM studies covering the NFL, NBA, 
MLB, amateur participatory sports, and the 
Olympics (Johnson 2008). Although the later 
CVM studies tend to find substantially larger 
values of sports public goods than did Johnson 
and Whitehead, peer-reviewed sports CVM arti- 
cles tend to find that the value of sports public 
goods fall short of the cost of constructing are- 
nas, stadiums, and other venues, except in the 
case of the Minnesota Vikings of the NFL (Fenn 
and Crooker 2009).1 
In contrast to the CVM, the CBM is a 
stated preference approach that directly elicits 
hypothetical behavior information from survey 
respondents. Respondents are asked about their 
behavioral responses to a hypothetical change. 
One strength of the CBM approach is its flexibil- 
ity. Hypothetical choices may be the only way to 
gain policy-relevant behavior information about 
situations where revealed preference data are not 
available. Yet, the major weakness of the CBM 
approach is its hypothetical nature. Respondents 
face unfamiliar situations with incomplete infor- 
mation. To date, the CBM has not been applied 
to sports attendance behavior. 
The combination and joint estimation of 
revealed and stated preference  data  exploit 
the contrasting strengths of the alternative 
approaches while minimizing their weaknesses 
(Whitehead et al. 2008). Stated preference data 
allow analysis of  behavior  beyond  the  range 
of historical experience. In many cases, hypo- 
thetical choices may not reflect budget, and 
other, constraints on behavior. For example, in 
a contingent behavior survey, respondents may 
answer a hypothetical game trip question with 
their good intentions of buying season tickets 
and going to every game. Yet, when they must 
make real choices, they confront unexpected 
constraints on time and income and make fewer 
game trips. Combining revealed preference and 
stated preference data allows mitigation of the 
 
1. Other methods that have been or could be used to 
value sports amenities include the hedonic price method 
(Carlino and Coulson 2004, 2006; Coates, Humphreys, and 
Zimbalist 2006), public referenda (Coates and Humphreys 
2006), or a combination of the two (Dehring, Depken, and 
Ward 2008). 
 
 
bias associated with hypothetical choices present 
in stated preference data. Grijalva et al. (2002) 
and Whitehead (2005) find evidence that jointly 
estimated revealed and stated preference models 
generate valid predictions of future behavior. 
In contrast to previous research valuing 
sports-related goods and services that rely solely 
on revealed preference data or the CVM, we 
jointly estimate a demand model using revealed 
and stated preference data. In the rest of the 
paper we summarize the survey data, describe 
the empirical methods, and present the empirical 
results. Conclusions follow. 
 
III. SURVEY DATA 
 
A telephone survey conducted during late 
2007 and early 2008 collected revealed pref- 
erence and stated preference data. A random 
sample frame of telephone numbers for the 
Edmonton and Calgary metropolitan areas and 
for the rest of Alberta was generated. The ini- 
tial screening questions selected either a male 
or female potential  respondent  aged  18 years 
or older. Based on pre-established quotas, data 
were  collected  from  937  people  (Edmonton, 
n = 339; Calgary, n = 331; nonmetropolitan 
Alberta, n = 267). In order to meet the quota 
requirements,  6,764  telephone  numbers  were 
called, with 1,610 of these numbers being 
excluded for technical reasons (e.g., not in ser- 
vice, busy/no answer), and another 2,346 num- 
bers being excluded for noneligibility and other 
reasons (e.g., business fax, less than 18 years of 
age, unable to speak English). Another 1,871 
people  refused  to  participate,  resulting  in  an 
overall response rate of 33% (i.e., 937/[937 + 
1,871]). 
The study instrument consisted of a com- 
puter-assisted telephone interviewing question- 
naire that included a description of a new 
downtown hockey arena with various features2: 
 
Suppose the Flames/Oilers decide to build a new, 
state-of-the-art hockey arena [in a complex that 
would also include affordable housing, arts and cul- 
tural space including galleries, theaters and museum 
space, and a casino] in downtown Calgary/Edmonton 
to replace the Pengrowth Saddledome/Rexall Place. 
[Suppose environmentally friendly materials and 
design will be used.] Some people say that building 
the arena, [housing, cultural complex, and casino] 
downtown would improve the quality of life in Cal- 
gary/Edmonton more than building it in the suburbs. 
 
2. Pengrowth Saddledome was renamed Scotiabank 
Saddledome in 2010. 
Respondents in the Edmonton and Calgary sur- 
veys received various combinations of arena 
characteristics ranging from a new arena with no 
additional characteristics and an arena with four 
additional characteristics (green design, afford- 
able housing, cultural complex, and a casino). 
The revealed preference data are based on 
hockey game trips that actually occurred during 
the 2006 – 2007 season. The stated preference 
data are based on future hockey game trips under 
various hypothetical conditions. The stated pref- 
erence data are used to simulate a change in 
demand resulting from changes in the quality 
of the hockey game experience, increased seat- 
ing availability, and changes in ticket  prices 
(see Appendix). Stated preference questions 
asked about future trips to the current arena: 
(1) with an expected first place finish, (2) with 
an expected last place finish, and (3) with an 
expected third place finish. Questions were then 
asked about future trips to a new downtown 
arena with additional upper level seating and 
a third place finish: (1) with a $15 ticket price 
decrease from the lowest walk-up ticket price, 
(2) with a $25 ticket price decrease from the 
lowest walk-up ticket price, and (3) with a $5 
ticket price decrease from the lowest walk-up 
ticket price. The combined revealed and stated 
preference pseudo-panel data have seven obser- 
vations for each respondent. 
Respondents in the Edmonton and Calgary 
surveys  were  asked  questions  about  Oilers 
and Flames games, respectively. Respondents 
in  the  nonmetropolitan  Alberta  survey  were 
asked “About how often do you visit Calgary/ 
Edmonton?”  Respondents  who  visit  Calgary 
more often are considered in the Flames mar- 
ket and asked questions about trips to Flames 
games. Respondents who visit Edmonton more 
often are considered in the Oilers market and 
asked  questions  about  trips  to  Oilers  games. 
Respondents were also asked “How long does it 
usually take you to get to Calgary/Edmonton?” 
The  average  number  of  hours  traveled  is  4 
to  Calgary  and  3  to  Edmonton.  Seventy-two 
percent of nonmetropolitan Alberta respondents 
visit the city with the lowest travel time more 
often. Hours traveled is converted to distance 
traveled assuming an average speed of 75 km/hr. 
Of the 937 completed interviews, we discard 
those cases with no response to the stated pref- 
erence attendance and other key questions. We 
employ a sample of 828 respondents. Table 1 
presents a summary of the game-trip-dependent 
variable. We present the data in terms of four 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Dependent Variables — Games Attended in Various Scenarios 
 
 
Calgary Flames  Edmonton Oilers 
Scenario Attend = 1 Attend = 0 Attend = 1 Attend = 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The mean figures show the average number of games attended in various scenarios. Those in Row 1 are the average 
games actually attended, according to revealed preference responses. Those in Rows 2 – 7 are stated preference averages under 
scenarios that differ according to whether the arena is old or new, ticket prices, and divisional finish. The responses in each 
of the two markets are broken down among those who attended games in 2006 – 2007 (Attend = 1) and those who did not 
(Attend = 0). 
a Revealed preference during 2006 – 2007 season. 
 
subsamples: (1) Flames market respondents who 
attended a game during the 2006 – 2007 season 
(n = 133); (2) Flames market respondents who 
had not attended a game (n = 246); (3) Oilers 
market respondents who had attended a game 
(n = 148); and (4) Oilers market respondents 
who had not attended a game (n = 301). Those 
in the Flames market who had attended at least 
one game attended an average of five games dur- 
ing the past season (5.19 in Table 1; we report 
rounded values in the text). Those in the Oil- 
ers market who had attended at least one game 
attended an average of four games during the 
past season.3,4 
In each subsample a similar pattern appears 
in each hypothetical scenario. Under the current 
arena and price scenario, respondents state they 
would attend about the same number of games 
regardless of the team’s expected finish. With a 
new arena and lower ticket prices, respondents 
who had attended a game during the past season 
said that their future attendance would roughly 
double. With a new arena and lower ticket 
prices, respondents who had not attended a game 
during the past season said that their future 
attendance would also increase significantly. 
 
3. These data exhibit digit bias which is one strategy 
that respondents rely on when recall is difficult (Tarrant 
and Manfredo 1993). Measurement error in the dependent 
variable should not bias regression coefficient efficient 
estimates but it could lead to inflated standard errors. 
4. NHL teams host 41 regular season games each 
season. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables.5 The self-reported ticket 
price paid by Flames and Oilers game attendees 
is $82 and $78, respectively.6 Several differ- 
ences across subsamples emerge. The average 
travel cost is lower for attendees relative to non- 
attendees, suggesting that travel distance is a 
factor in the game trip decision.7 The average 
household income is higher for attendees com- 
pared to nonattendees, suggesting that respon- 
dent ability to pay may be a factor in the game 
trip decision.8 In both markets male respondents 
are more likely to attend games. Game atten- 
dees are younger relative to nonattendees. Per- 
haps because Scotiabank Saddledome is closer 
to Calgary’s downtown than Rexall Place is to 
 
5. Our sample is slightly older and more affluent than 
the population. 
6. Ticket prices paid for Flames and Oilers games range 
from $11 to $300 and $20 to $179, suggesting that the 
reported price paid includes secondary market purchases. 
7. Travel cost is computed as c = αd + 
(θy/ h)(d/mph),  where  α  is  the  average  cost  per  mile 
(including gas, oil, and depreciation), d is round-trip 
distance, θ is the opportunity cost of time, 0 < θ < 1, y 
is household  income, h is annual  work  hours, and  mph 
is average miles per hour. We use the following values: 
α = 0.32, θ = 0.33, h = 2000, and mph = 75 k/h. These 
values are not unusual in the literature (Phaneuf and Smith 
2005); however, our results are likely sensitive to alternative 
values (Hynes, Hanley, and O’Donoghue 2009). 
8. Sixteen percent of the income variables are imputed 
using an income regression (R2 = 0.27). In this model 
income increases with education and age (at a diminishing 
rate). Income is higher for males, married respondents, and 
metro respondents (relative to rural Albertans). 
 
Arena 
Price (Flames, 
Oilers) 
 
Finish 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Old RPa 3, 5 5.19 7.85  0.00 0.00  3.84 4.42  0.00 0.00 
Old 35, 45 1 7.08 11.86  0.27 0.80  5.76 9.10  0.57 2.85 
Old 35, 45 5 5.62 10.53  0.13 0.66  4.87 10.42  0.23 0.91 
Old 35, 45 3 5.95 10.31  0.19 0.70  4.97 7.86  0.32 0.97 
New 20, 30 3 10.47 13.52  1.67 5.20  7.85 12.77  1.44 4.12 
New 10, 20 3 13.30 15.59  2.68 7.34  9.48 13.54  2.10 5.57 
New 30, 40 3 8.99 12.19  1.13 3.62  6.35 8.28  0.81 1.65 
Cases    133   246   148   301 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Independent Variables 
 
 
Calgary Flames  Edmonton Oilers  
Attend = 1 Attend = 0 Attend = 1 Attend = 0 
 
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
Deviation    Mean 
Standard 
Deviation    Mean 
Standard 
Deviation    Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
RP-PRICE Actual ticket price 82.08 35.87 — — 78.33 23.50 — — 
TRAVCOST Travel cost to 
downtown 
26.36 67.45 43.75 65.76 39.47 57.68 59.87 83.35 
INCOME Household income 110.86 35.23 77.30 36.99 93.78 38.09 70.57 39.30 
 ($1,000s)         
MALE 1 if male 0.63 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.49 
MARRIED 1 if married 0.73 0.45 0.65 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.71 0.45 
AGE Age of respondent 42.83 13.66 50.15 15.25 43.28 14.49 51.68 16.46 
EDUC Years of schooling 14.50 2.10 14.11 2.22 13.84 2.12 13.73 2.59 
LIVE 1 if lives in 
downtown 
0.08 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.22 
WORK 1 if works in 
downtown 
0.25 0.43 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 
PROPERTY 1 if owns property in 0.69 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.50 
 the area         
TENURE Length of time at 19.95 16.09 17.18 17.40 20.31 17.91 21.24 21.57 
 residence         
ALBERTA 1 if Alberta survey 0.14  0.34 0.30  0.46 0.25  0.43 0.35  0.48 
Cases   133   246   148   301  
 
Edmonton’s downtown, a higher proportion of 
Flames attendees live and work downtown. A 
greater number of nonattendees are from the 
nonmetropolitan, rest of Alberta sample. This 
is further evidence that travel costs may affect 
attendance decisions. Other variables show little 
difference across subsamples. 
 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
The Poisson regression model is often used 
to study count data such as number of recreation 
trips (Haab and McConnell 2002). Assume that 
xit is the number of revealed and stated pref- 
erence hockey game trips taken by individual i 
in scenario t , which is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution with mean λit : 
e−λit λxit 
on individual specific and random error. The 
random effects Poisson demand model is as 
follows: 
(2) 
ln λit  = β0 + βpR p
R + βpp
S + βcci + βyyi 
it iy 
+ βRPRP + δ1Z + γ1D + i + eit , 
where pR is the revealed preference ticket price 
(pR = 0 if x = 0), pS is the stated preference 
ticket price, c is the round-trip travel cost to the 
hockey arena, y is income, RP is a revealed pref- 
erence dummy variable; β, δ, and γ are coeffi- 
cients (vectors) to be estimated; i is the random 
effect for group (person) i and eit is a mean zero 
error term. Individuals are indexed i = 1, . . . , n, 
and t = 1, . . . , 7 denotes seasonal hockey game 
trip demand in the pseudo-panel data. Z is a vec- 
(1) Pr(xit ) = 
it 
xit ! 
, xit  = 0, 1, 2 , . . .   tor of scenario design variables (i.e., new arena, 
new arena characteristics, and team finish) and D 
The natural log of the mean number of 
revealed and stated preference game trips is 
assumed to be a linear function of prices, 
income, and scenario dummy variables. To 
allow for variation across hockey fans that can- 
not be explained by the independent variables, 
we assume that the mean number of revealed 
and stated preference game trips also depends 
is a vector of demographic characteristics. The 
RP dummy variable is included to test for bias 
in hypothetical responses: RP = 1 for revealed 
preference trip data (t = 1) and 0 for stated pref- 
erence trip data (t > 1). Pooling the data sug- 
gests that panel data methods be used to account 
for differences in variance across sample indi- 
viduals,  i,  and  scenarios,  t .  The  distribution 
of trips is Poisson with conditional mean and 
variance, λit . If exp(λit ) is assumed to follow 
a gamma distribution, then the unconditional 
trips, xit , follow a negative binomial distribution 
game trip is a weighted average of the change 
in ticket price and travel cost consumer surplus 
(7) 
(Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984).9 �CSpc (�Z) δZ�Z θ δZ�Z 
θ 
\ 
.
With  the  semi-log  functional  form  price, x 
= − 
βp
p + 
βc
c 
travel cost and income elasticities are ep = 
βpp
S, ec = βcc, ey = βyy when evaluated at the 
means of the variables. The full-price elasticity 
is the weighted average of the price and travel 
cost elasticities: 
Equations (5) and (7) diverge from Equations 
(4) and (6) with statistically significant coeffi- 
cients on the travel cost coefficients. If the travel 
cost coefficient is statistically insignificant then 
that  term  drops  out  of  the  consumer  surplus 
(3) epc = ep θp + ec θc, 
equation. 
 is the ticket price and travel 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
With the semi-log functional form the eco- 
nomic benefit per hockey game for the repre- 
sentative hockey fan as measured by average 
consumer surplus (CS) per game in the ticket 
market is (Bockstael and Strand 1987): 
Table 3 presents the random effects Poisson 
coefficient estimates for the Calgary Flames and 
Edmonton Oilers markets. The models include 
the revealed preference ticket price as an inde- 
pendent variable. Each model contains a dummy 
variable for the new arena scenario and the new 
(4) 
.
arena dummy interacted with the nonmetropoli- 
The economic benefit per hockey game trip is 
a weighted average of the ticket price and travel 
cost consumer surplus 
tan sample (this is the only variable that 
indicates different behaviors across metropoli- 
tan and nonmetropolitan samples). Team finish 
and dummy variables for arena features, green 
design and construction, affordable housing, a 
(5) CSpc 1
 θp + 1 
\ θc    . casino and a cultural complex are included. Each 
x 
= − 
βp βc 
The economic benefit of a change in the 
hockey experience per game measured by the 
j th scenario design variable  Zj and evaluated 
in the ticket market is: 
of the arena features dummy variables is coded 
as zero for the nonmetropolitan sample because 
those respondents were not asked the arena sce- 
nario questions. In addition, dummy variables 
for the revealed preference scenario,  gender, 
and marital status are included. Other variables 
(6) �CSp (�Z) δZ �Z 
,
included in the model are continuous: household 
x 
= − 
βp
where δZj is the regression coefficient on the j th
scenario design variable. The economic benefit 
of a change in the hockey experience per hockey 
9. The panel data random effects Poisson model relaxes
the equal mean and variance assumption of a cross-sectional 
Poisson model. It is distributed negative binomial with 
overdispersion parameter α. It is the standard when esti- 
mating demand models with revealed and stated preference 
data combined in a pseudo-panel (Whitehead et al. 2008). 
The main advantage of the random effects Poisson over the 
random effects negative binomial is that it allows for cross- 
equation correlation (Landry and Liu, 2011). As there are 
a large number of zeros in the dependent variable, zero- 
inflated Poisson models were also attempted in the context 
of random parameter and latent class Poisson models. Each 
of these models fits the data well. However, results lead to 
larger consumer surplus estimates than we present here. As, 
to our knowledge, no study in the revealed and stated prefer- 
ence literature has investigated these alternative models and 
that investigation is beyond the scope of this paper we leave 
this exploration to future research. 
income, age, and years of schooling. Other vari- 
ables in Table 1 are omitted from the demand 
models because of multicollinearity or statistical 
irrelevance. 
We split each market into those who had 
revealed a preference for hockey  games dur- 
ing the 2006 – 2007 season (attendees) and those 
who had not (nonattendees). The random effects 
Poisson coefficient estimates  for each  market 
and attendees and nonattendees subsamples are 
presented in Table 3. In each of the attendee 
models, the revealed preference coefficient is 
negative and significant. There are two inter- 
pretations of this result. First, it might indicate 
hypothetical bias. In the hypothetical scenarios, 
respondents said that they would like to attend 
more games than they are actually able to attend. 
The second interpretation is that this result mea- 
sures latent demand at the current seating capac- 
ity and ticket prices. Respondents would like to 
cost share of the pull price
TABLE 3 
Random Effects Panel Data Poisson Model: Hockey Game Attendance Demand (Attendee vs. 
Nonattendee) 
Calgary Flames Edmonton Oilers 
Attend = 1 Attend = 0 Attend = 1 Attend = 0 
Coefficient t -ratio Coefficient t -ratio Coefficient t -ratio Coefficient t -ratio 
Constant 4.153 4.38 0.990 0.46 3.335 3.69 3.363 1.79 
RP 
RP-PRICE 
−0.177 
0.002 
−6.06 
0.66 
−0.214 
0.005 
−5.47 
1.03 
SP-PRICE −0.020 −15.66 −0.044 −23.12 −0.020 −10.63 −0.046 −14.60 
TRAVCOST −0.004 −2.52 −0.001 −0.20 −0.001 −0.61 0.002 0.51 
NEWARENA 0.237 9.80 1.943 28.86 0.004 0.13 0.718 9.41 
NEWARENA × ALBERTA 0.341 11.35 −0.387 −3.16 0.420 19.14 0.663 7.68 
FINISH −0.058 −7.81 −0.241 −2.95 −0.043 −4.90 −0.386 −11.90 
INCOME 0.001 0.26 0.006 0.89 0.007 2.26 −0.003 −0.62 
MALE 0.051 0.26 0.069 0.14 0.334 1.63 0.404 1.09 
MARRIED 0.230 0.82 0.415 0.73 −0.421 −1.86 −0.031 −0.06 
AGE −0.019 −2.32 −0.034 −2.26 −0.014 −1.81 −0.047 −3.23 
EDUC −0.083 −1.24 −0.001 −0.01 −0.079 −1.74 0.003 0.03 
GREEN 0.271 1.16 0.261 0.37 −0.045 −0.17 −0.335 −0.71 
CASINO 0.225 0.75 −0.082 −0.10 −0.024 −0.08 1.362 2.00 
HOUSING 0.285 0.86 0.243 0.33 −0.172 −0.61 −0.075 −0.13 
ARTS −0.616 −1.90 −0.607 −0.74 0.347 1.17 0.876 1.29 
α 1.185 5.93 5.591 7.57 0.914 7.89 4.731 7.88 
LL 
Cases 
−2733 
133 
−1198 
246 
−2703 
148 
−1508 
301 
Periods 7 7 7 7 
attend more games but game sell-outs constrain 
their behavior. 
A. Prices and Income 
The effect of revealed preference ticket price 
on the number of games attended is ambiguous 
because current game trips are quantity con- 
strained, ticket price reflects quality, and ticket 
price is partially endogenous as an increasing 
function of income  in  the  secondary  market. 
In each model, the actual ticket price coeffi- 
cient is not significantly different from zero. The 
coefficient on the stated preference price vari- 
able is negative and statistically significant, as 
expected. Demand is inelastic across markets: 
ep = −0.57  for  Calgary  and  ep = −0.77  for 
Edmonton.10  The coefficient on the travel cost 
10. Economic theory indicates that each dollar of cost 
should be considered equivalently by consumers, suggesting 
that ticket price and travel cost should be added together to 
form a single cost variable. However, model performance 
is superior with these variables entered separately. This 
suggests that consumers respond differently to the two types 
of cost. Perhaps, the travel cost variable is capturing the 
cost of multipurpose trips. In addition to a hockey game, 
respondents could also enjoy shopping or dining in the area. 
variable is negative and statistically significant 
in the Calgary attendee model. The travel cost 
elasticity is ec = −0.10 for Calgary and the full- 
price elasticity is epc = −0.45 in the Calgary 
attendee model.11 The coefficient on the income 
variable is positive and statistically significant in 
the Edmonton attendee model. The income elas- 
ticity is ey  = 0.78. Other price and income coef- 
ficients are not statistically significant. In each 
nonattendee model, the coefficient on the stated 
preference price variable is negative and statisti- 
cally significant. Demand is elastic: ep = −1.25 
for Calgary and ep = −1.78 for Edmonton. The 
coefficients on the travel cost and income vari- 
ables are statistically insignificant in each non- 
attendee model. 
B. Capacity 
In each model, a new downtown arena with 
plenty of upper level seats would increase 
attendance in three of the four models, especially 
In this case we would expect the travel cost elasticity to be 
less than the ticket price elasticity. 
11. The market price and travel cost weights are 0.75 
and 0.25, respectively. 
TABLE 4 
Consumer Surplus Estimates 
Calgary Flames Edmonton Oilers  
Attend = 1 Attend = 0 Attend = 1 Attend = 0 
for the nonmetropolitan Alberta sample in three 
of the four models. According to the marginal 
effects,12 Flames attendees and nonattendees 
would go to two more games each year. Fifty-six 
percent of Oilers nonattendees would attend one 
more game each year. Those from nonmetropoli- 
tan Alberta in the Flames market who already 
attended games would attend an additional three 
games in addition to the two suggested by the 
NEWARENA coefficient each year. Those from 
the rest of Alberta in the Oilers market who 
already attended games would also attend an 
additional three games each year in a new down- 
town arena. 
C. Other Results 
In each model, an improvement in the stand- 
ings would increase attendance. According to 
the marginal effects, 47% and 21% of Flames 
attendees and nonattendees would go to one 
additional game with a one-place improvement 
in standings, as would 26% and 30% of Oilers 
attendees and nonattendees. Flames attendees 
would go to five fewer games each year if the 
new arena also included a cultural complex. No 
other arena design features affect attendance. In 
terms of demographic variables, older respon- 
dents attend fewer games. For Oilers attendees, 
males attend two more games, married respon- 
dents attend almost three fewer games, and each 
two years of schooling reduces attendance by 
one game. Oilers nonattendees would  go  to 
one additional game if the new arena contained 
a casino. 
12. Marginal effects are not reported in Table 3. 
VI. BENEFITS
The demand models in Table 3 provide the 
basis for consumer surplus estimates in Table 4. 
All of the consumer surplus values are obtained 
from the stated preference price coefficient. We 
use the demand slope based on the variation in 
stated preference prices with a new arena, which 
are lower than what most attendees paid for their 
tickets, to extrapolate the demand curve to the 
choke price. To the extent that this extrapolation 
is inaccurate, the consumer surplus results are 
inaccurate. 
A. Consumer Surplus per Game 
The status quo consumer surplus per game 
is $50 for both the Flames and Oilers atten- 
dees ($50.37 and $50.14 in Table 413)and $23 
and $22 for Flames and Oilers nonattendees. 
That attendee consumer surplus exceeds that for 
(revealed preference) nonattendees makes the- 
oretical sense as the willingness and ability of 
nonattendees to pay for a game is lower accord- 
ing to the revealed preference of nonattendance. 
Consumer surplus per game may be an under- 
estimate of the total value of the game trip for 
all consumers. The full value of the game trip 
is the consumer surplus of a game trip consider- 
ing both ticket prices and travel costs. The only 
statistically significant coefficient for travel cost 
is for game attendees in the Flames market. The 
full-price consumer surplus per game trip, $103, 
is weighted by the dollar shares of the different 
13. Consumer surplus numbers reported in the text are 
rounded. 
Consumer Surplus (CS) per Game (X) CS/X t -stat CS/X t -stat CS/X t -stat CS/X t -stat 
Status quo 50.37 15.66  22.92 23.12 50.14 10.63 21.71 14.60 
Change in CS per Game ACS/X t -stat ACS/X t -stat ACS/X t -stat ACS/X t -stat 
With current arena 8.89 5.34  10.75 4.30  
With new arena for metro residents 11.92 6.14  44.52 14.84 0.22 0.13  15.59 5.84 
With new arena for Alberta residents 29.10 8.37  35.66 10.29 21.30 6.07  29.98 7.58 
Additional place in standings 2.95 6.38  5.52 2.85 2.14 5.18  8.37 8.89 
With new arena and green design 13.65 1.17  5.97 0.37 −2.26 −0.17  −7.26 −0.71 
With new arena and casino 11.35 0.75  −1.87 −0.10  −1.20 −0.08  29.58 1.95 
With new arena and affordable housing 14.37 0.85  5.58 0.33 −8.62 −0.62  −1.63 −0.13 
With new arena and cultural complex −31.01 −1.87  −13.91 −0.74 17.41 1.18 19.02 1.29 
 
 
costs. However, interpretation of the full-price 
consumer surplus per game trip is complicated 
by the possibility of multipurpose trips. As the 
travel cost coefficient is statistically insignificant 
in the other three models we do not further dis- 
cuss its effect on the value of game trips until 
the conclusions, except to note that consumer 
surplus per game estimates do not include these 
values. 
Under the latent demand  interpretation  of 
the revealed preference dummy variable — 
indicating that respondents would attend more 
games if seats were available — the consumer 
surplus for attendees is $9 per game and $11 
for each additional Flames and Oilers game with 
the current arena and  ticket  prices,  assuming 
the respondent could obtain a ticket. This result 
makes intuitive sense as additional games are 
subject to diminishing returns and should be 
expected to generate lower value. 
The change in consumer surplus for each 
additional game in a new downtown arena is 
$12 and $45 for Flames attendees and non- 
attendees residing in Calgary, and $0 and $16 
for Oilers  attendees  and  nonattendees  living 
in Edmonton. In nonmetropolitan Alberta the 
consumer surplus of each additional game in a 
new downtown arena is $29 and $36 for Flames 
attendees and nonattendees, and $21 and $30 for 
Oilers attendees and nonattendees. The quality 
factor can be interpreted either as an increase in 
perceived value of games in a new arena with 
additional amenities or, in the case of Edmonton, 
that the downtown location is preferred because 
of more convenience or proximity to additional 
downtown amenities. 
The bandwagon effect is evident in that 
each additional place in the standings is worth 
$3 and $6 in additional consumer surplus per 
game to Flames attendees and  nonattendees, 
and $2 and $8 to Oilers attendees and non- 
attendees. Adding a casino to a new downtown 
arena would increase consumer surplus by $30 
per game for current Oilers nonattendees. But, 
perhaps indicating that artistic culture and sport 
do not mix (Johnson et al. 2007), adding a 
cultural complex to a new arena in Calgary 
would reduce consumer surplus per game by $31 
for Flames attendees. 
 
B. Consumer Surplus per Season 
Combining the marginal effects (trip) esti- 
mates with the consumer surplus per game 
estimates provides estimates of the change in 
consumer surplus per season. Considering the 
status quo without the inclusion of travel costs or 
higher ticket prices, Flames fans who attend an 
average of five games enjoy consumer surplus 
of $261 over the course of the season. Oilers 
fans who attend an average of four games enjoy 
consumer surplus of $193 per season. Flames 
and Oilers fans who attend games would enjoy 
an additional $13 and $14 per season, if seats 
were always available. 
With a new arena, Flames attendees and 
nonattendees and Oilers nonattendees in the 
metropolitan  area  would  enjoy  an  additional 
$23, $75, and $9 in consumer surplus over the 
course of the season. Similarly, with a new 
arena, Flames attendees and nonattendees, and 
Oilers attendees and nonattendees from non- 
metropolitan Alberta would enjoy an additional 
$136, $48, $56, and $32 in consumer surplus 
over the course of the season. As the impact 
on consumer surplus of a rise in the standings 
affects all games attended, not only the increase 
in games, the seasonal effect on consumer sur- 
plus is the product of the change in consumer 
surplus per trip and the sum of baseline trips 
and the marginal effect of a change in the stand- 
ings. Flames attendees and nonattendees would 
enjoy $14 and $27 in additional consumer sur- 
plus during the season, while Oilers attendees 
and nonattendees would get an additional $11 
and $41 for a one-unit rise in the standings. 
Assuming the value of games attended with a 
new arena is also affected, the cost of a cul- 
tural complex to Flames attendees is $53 in lost 
consumer surplus over the course of the season. 
The benefit of a casino to current Oilers non- 
attendees is $46 in additional consumer surplus 
over the course of the season. 
 
C. Policy Implications 
Our results can be used to inform policy 
makers. Most major league sports stadiums and 
arenas in North America have been built with 
extensive public subsidies. Long (2005) calcu- 
lates an average present value of public subsi- 
dies, in 2001 dollars, of $175 million for each of 
the 99 major league hockey, basketball, football, 
and baseball facilities in use in 2001 in North 
America. An extensive literature measuring the 
economic impact of stadiums and arenas on jobs, 
taxes, and incomes concludes that the economic 
impacts are much too small to warrant such sub- 
sidies on efficiency grounds. See, for example, 
Baade  (1996),  Noll  and  Zimbalist  (1997),  or 
Coates and Humphreys (1999). See Coates 
(2007) for an overview of the literature. Others 
have measured the benefits from public goods, 
such as civic pride, produced by sports teams. 
They reach the same conclusion as the analyses 
of the economic impacts — such large subsidies 
cannot be justified on efficiency grounds. See 
Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead (2001) and 
Johnson, Mondello, and Whitehead (2007) for 
examples, or Johnson (2008) for an overview of 
the literature. 
Studies of economic impacts or public goods, 
however, do not address the consumption bene- 
fits as does the current paper. Could consump- 
tion benefits enjoyed by game attendees make 
public subsidies efficient? There are a number 
of alternative benefit-cost analysis scenarios and 
we consider only one. We estimate the benefits 
of a new arena by the sum of consumer surplus 
of additional seats and the additional consumer 
surplus of improved seating of the existing num- 
ber of seats. We assume the new arena reaches 
the maximum NHL capacity of 21,273 seats and 
the additional seats are filled with (revealed pref- 
erence) nonattendees. The per game consumer 
surplus for additional seats in a new arena is 
$45 and $16 for those metropolitan residents in 
the Calgary and Edmonton markets who do not 
currently attend games. Forty-one home sellout 
games would generate annual consumer surplus 
of $3.6 million and $2.8 million in Calgary and 
Edmonton for the additional seating capacity. 
The Calgary Flames would generate additional 
consumption benefits with a new arena. Current 
metropolitan attendees in the Calgary Flames 
market would enjoy an additional $12 in con- 
sumer surplus per game in a new arena. At 
current arena capacity over  41  home  games, 
the annual benefit of additional quality for the 
existing number of seats is $9.5 million. The 
total annual benefit of a new arena in Calgary 
is $13 million. The annual benefit of additional 
arena quality in the Edmonton Oilers market is 
zero, so the total annual benefit of a new arena 
is $2.8 million. 
We consider two alternative discount rates: 
2% and 7%. With a 2% discount rate and con- 
sumption benefits accruing for 30 years, the 
present value of consumer surplus is $292 mil- 
lion in Calgary and $63 million in Edmonton. 
With a 7% discount rate, the present value of 
consumer surplus is $162 million in Calgary and 
$35 million in Edmonton. A new NHL arena 
costs between $275 million and $450 million. 
Therefore,  the  consumption  benefits  of  new 
seating for the Edmonton Oilers do not appear 
to justify a new downtown arena when future 
benefits are discounted at 2% and 7%. Con- 
sidering the Calgary Flames, the consumption 
benefits only justify a new arena in a best case 
scenario: at the lower end of the range of arena 
costs and when future consumption benefits are 
discounted at 2%. 
While a benefit-cost analysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper, a number of issues should be 
considered. A sensitivity analysis of the benefit 
estimates should consider the full consumer sur- 
plus of Flames game trips based on ticket prices 
and travel costs. As the status quo consumer 
surplus is about twice as high when consider- 
ing travel costs, the economic benefits of a new 
arena would be much higher and could justify 
new arena construction. 
These figures suggest that in some cases, 
consumption benefits may help justify on effi- 
ciency grounds the large public subsidies typi- 
cally offered for new stadiums and arenas. This 
is not to say that subsidies are good public pol- 
icy. There may be other projects that would 
produce greater benefits for the amount spent. 
Teams may be able to extract much of the con- 
sumer surplus through personal seat licenses or 
through price discrimination, making subsidies 
unnecessary. Nevertheless, this paper, the first 
to estimate consumer surplus from data on indi- 
vidual fan  preferences,  finds  that  large  gains 
in consumer surplus may render some stadium 
subsidies much less inefficient than suggested 
by studies of the economic impacts and public 
goods alone. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is the first to  estimate  game 
trip demand functions for individual sports fans 
using microdata. Because capacity constraints 
are often binding in the NHL, estimation of indi- 
vidual hockey demand functions using revealed 
preference data alone would be difficult, even if 
individual-level microdata were available. The 
results show that hockey fans who already attend 
games would buy more tickets each year if seats 
were available at lower prices. The results also 
show that fans are sensitive to team quality, and 
that each rung a team climbs in its divisional 
standings will increase game trip demand. We 
include travel  costs  as  an  additional  variable 
to explain demand behavior and find some evi- 
dence that it is a significant determinant of game 
attendance. The full-price consumer surplus per 
game trip is twice as great as the consumer sur- 
plus per game. 
Binding capacity constraints have a large 
impact on the number of games attended by 
metropolitan fans of the Calgary Flames, impos- 
ing a large deadweight loss. Capacity constraints 
also have a large effect on nonmetropolitan 
Alberta residents in both markets. These results 
suggest that the benefits of new arenas in Cal- 
gary and Edmonton would accrue to a large 
extent to nonmetropolitan residents. That the 
capacity constraints could impose such large 
welfare costs may seem surprising, but other 
evidence is consistent with this conclusion. For 
instance, the average ticket prices in Calgary and 
Edmonton are among the highest in the NHL, 
according to Team Marketing Report, a  firm 
that compiles ticket price data for professional 
sports teams. The high ticket prices and sold out 
seasons, along with the fact that Calgary and 
Edmonton are among the smallest metropoli- 
tan areas in the NHL, are evidence of a high 
per capita demand for hockey tickets, consistent 
with the survey responses and estimated demand 
functions in this paper. 
Stadium and arena complexes built or pro- 
posed in the past decade have increasingly 
included features and amenities far beyond the 
actual sports building. Petco Field, a baseball 
stadium in San Diego, and Nationwide Arena, 
a hockey arena in Columbus, Ohio, are the 
anchors of development districts including hous- 
ing, entertainment, and other features. Propo- 
nents of stadiums and arenas as tools for urban 
revitalization often argue that sports venues 
alone cannot succeed in  transforming  decay- 
ing urban districts. Other types of development, 
together with a stadium or  arena,  they  say, 
can bring round-the-clock activity and life to 
a downtown or other depressed neighborhood 
(Rosentraub 2008). 
We find that features such as housing, arts 
and cultural space, and casinos in arena devel- 
opment projects would have  little  effect  on 
the demand for hockey tickets in Calgary and 
Edmonton, with two exceptions. Demand for 
hockey by Calgarians who already attend games 
would fall if a new  arena  complex  included 
arts and cultural space, while demand for Oil- 
ers tickets by non-Edmontonians would rise 
substantially if  a  casino  were  built  alongside 
a new arena. That nonsports features mostly 
have no effect on demand for hockey, and may 
even decrease the demand for hockey, sug- 
gests that increased consumer surplus of hockey 
fans cannot be considered a benefit of diversity 
in development projects. However, these addi- 
tional features may attract nonhockey fans to 
the development complex. 
The results of the status quo annual consumer 
surplus estimation in this paper, based on indi- 
vidual demand functions estimated from both 
revealed and stated preference data, are broadly 
consistent with the estimates of annual consumer 
surplus from MLB developed by Irani (1997). 
Using the full consumer surplus of a new arena 
for the Calgary market would suggest that the 
efficient outcome is to build the arena. However, 
as the benefits would accrue to the fans attend- 
ing games rather than to the public at large, and 
because the Flames could finance much of the 
cost by extracting additional consumer surplus, 
it would be difficult to use the increased con- 
sumer surplus to justify a public subsidy. 
Future research should investigate more de- 
tailed hypothetical scenarios to determine the 
sensitivity of our results to survey design. New 
stadiums and arenas incorporate many advances 
in construction technology and architectural 
design that result in higher demand for tickets. 
Better sightlines, more restrooms, restaurants, 
and concession stands made easily accessible 
by wide aisles and concourses make for more 
comfortable environments for spectators. Such 
improvements mean that, at least in the hon- 
eymoon period, fans are willing to buy more 
tickets at higher prices. The hypothetical sce- 
narios presented in the surveys in Alberta did 
not mention such amenities. Perhaps respon- 
dents assumed such amenities, common in new 
arenas, would be included. But to the extent they 
did not, the potential gains to consumer surplus 
from a new arena might be different than the 
gains estimated in this paper. 
Further, our analysis is limited in a number 
of ways. A potentially important independent 
variable for game attendees is the actual ticket 
price paid. Our survey design put little empha- 
sis on collection of this variable. Future research 
should consider the relationship between ticket 
prices and individual game attendance. We also 
are cavalier about capacity constraints in the 
hypothetical new arenas. If actual demand for 
seats in a new arena exceeds capacity then ticket 
prices will rise and consumer surplus will be 
transferred to producers or ticket dealers and 
our consumer surplus estimates will be biased 
upwards. 
Two econometric issues related to revealed 
and stated preference data are not addressed. 
First, revealed preference data collection likely 
suffers from  recall  bias  and  digit  bias which 
results in measurement error. This may result 
in inflated standard errors for our coefficients. 
Second, we employ the random effects Pois- 
son model which is the most stable of the count 
data models applied to panel data. However, as 
our dependent variable contains a large num- 
ber of zeros, zero-inflated Poisson models may 
be preferred. Future research should pursue a 
comparison of alternative count data models in 
the context of combined revealed and stated 
preference data. 
Previous nonmarket valuation methods, such 
as the CVM, applied to sports public  goods 
have been used in isolation from others. Future 
research should use multi-methods and con- 
sider the convergent validity of consumer sur- 
plus estimates. For example, a comparison study 
between the hedonic pricing method, CVM, and 
travel cost method could be designed to estimate 
the benefits of sports teams to a city. If the con- 
sumer surplus estimates converge, or diverge for 
theoretical or methodological reasons, then con- 
fidence in the individual estimates is enhanced. 
APPENDIX: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
This appendix provides the telephone survey questions 
used to elicit revealed and stated preference data for the 
Calgary Flames games. Similar questions  were  used  for 
the Edmonton Oilers games. The full survey can be found 
at http://econ.appstate.edu/AGRI or upon request from the 
authors. 
The next few questions are about your attendance at 
Calgary Flames games. 
C1. How many Calgary Flames games did you attend 
during the 2006-07 season? 
games— if zero, skip to C3. 
C2. About how much do you usually pay for your Flames 
tickets? 
dollars 
C3. Suppose the Flames are expected to finish first in 
their division and challenge for the Stanley Cup this season. 
About how many Flames games would you plan to attend 
in Calgary this season? 
games— if zero, go to C6 
C4. Now suppose that the Flames are expected to finish 
last in their division. About how many Flames games would 
you plan to attend in Calgary this season? 
games 
C5. Now suppose that the Flames are expected to finish 
third in their division and make the playoffs this season. 
About how many Flames games would you plan to attend 
in Calgary this season? 
games 
C6.  Suppose  that  the  Flames  build  a  new  profes- 
luxury suites. For these questions, please assume that your 
personal situation stays the same. For example, you have 
the same job, income and family situation. Also assume that 
the Flames are expected to finish third in their division and 
make the playoffs. OK? 
C7. If other ticket prices don’t change at the new arena 
and there are plenty of additional upper level seats with 
unobstructed views available at a price of $20 per game, 
how many Flames games would you plan to attend in the 
new downtown Calgary arena during the season? 
games 
C8. If the tickets for the additional upper level seats with 
unobstructed views are available at a price of $10 per game, 
how many Flames games would you plan to attend in the 
new downtown Calgary arena during the season? 
games 
C9. If the tickets for the additional upper level seats with 
unobstructed views are available at a price of $30 per game, 
how many Flames games would you plan to attend in the 
new downtown Calgary arena during the season? 
games 
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